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Abstract 
 
Information on the seismic response of chemical containers located in storage racks is very limited. Unfortunately,
no clearly established data and statistics exist related to potential damage of chemical racking systems during
earthquakes. Hence, this work presents an approach for developing fragility curves for chemical racking systems in
the cross-aisle direction through dynamic non-linear analysis. It aims to simulate the structural behaviour of
various racking systems in the cross-aisle direction for the worst-case scenario, in order to quantify the
vulnerability of chemical racks in seismic areas and to better understand the associated natech risk. Analytical
fragility curves and a fault tree model were derived and used to evaluate the probabilities of chemical containers
falling from racks. The damage state limits were considered as four levels of intensity of loss of containment. Three
damage modes (overturning, sliding, and buckling), 2 types of chemical containers (205 l metal drums and 1000 l
IBCs), 3 types of rack base anchoring (unanchored, anchored-brittle, and anchored-plastic), and four rack heights
(3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, 9 m) were considered in the analysis. Overall, 24 fragility curves were developed based on 26 strong
motion records from the PEER Strong Motion database. However, the analytical method employed in this study
can also be used for deriving fragility curves for other merchandise types of racking structures. In order to assess
the natech risk of a chemical rack containing a flammable substance, to test the developed fragility curves, and to
illustrate the natech risk assessment and mapping capabilities of RAPID-N, a case study based on the 1786 Olivieri
earthquake scenario was conducted. The findings demonstrate that chemical racks loaded with IBCs are more
vulnerable than those loaded with drums and although a very robust anchorage reduces the probability of
collapse of the rack, it increases the probability of chemical containers falling. 
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 Abstract 
 
Information on the seismic response of chemical containers located in storage racks is very 
limited. Unfortunately, no clearly established data and statistics exist related to potential damage 
of chemical racking systems during earthquakes. Hence, this work presents an approach for 
developing fragility curves for chemical racking systems in the cross-aisle direction through 
dynamic non-linear analysis. It aims to simulate the structural behaviour of various racking 
systems in the cross-aisle direction for the worst-case scenario, in order to quantify the 
vulnerability of chemical racks in seismic areas and to better understand the associated natech 
risk. Analytical fragility curves and a fault tree model were derived and used to evaluate the 
probabilities of chemical containers falling from racks. The damage state limits were considered 
as four levels of intensity of loss of containment. Three damage modes (overturning, sliding, and 
buckling), two types of chemical containers (205 l metal drums and 1000 l IBCs), three types of 
rack base anchoring (unanchored, anchored-brittle, and anchored-plastic), and four rack heights 
(3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, 9 m) were considered in the analysis. Overall, twenty-four fragility curves were 
developed based on twenty-six strong motion records from the PEER Strong Motion database. 
However, the analytical method employed in this study can also be used for deriving fragility 
curves for other merchandise types of racking structures. 
In order to assess the natech risk of a chemical rack containing a flammable substance, to test 
the developed fragility curves, and to illustrate the natech risk assessment and mapping 
capabilities of RAPID-N, a case study based on the 1786 Olivieri earthquake scenario was 
conducted. The findings demonstrate that chemical racks loaded with IBCs are more vulnerable 
than those loaded with drums. Moreover, although a very robust anchorage reduces the 
probability of collapse of the rack, it increases the probability of chemical containers falling. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A number of hazards can be created when storing packaged dangerous substances. These 
hazards can affect people working within the storage site, the emergency services in the event of 
an accident, the general public off site and the environment. In a chemical warehouse (Figure 1), 
fire is generally considered to be the greatest hazard (HSE, 2009). In rare cases, certain stored 
substances can undergo violent decomposition when engulfed in flame, and result in an 
explosion. Either event can be trigged by natural hazards or disasters. These accidents are 
commonly referred to as natech accidents (Showalter & Myers, 1994; Krausmann et al., 2011). 
For example, in the 1970 Tarnava flood, the chemical platform Tarnaveni was affected (Boca 
et al., 2010). Water entered the warehouse where 800 tons of carbide was stored in wooden 
barrels. The exothermic reaction caused a powerful explosion, which destroyed all buildings 
within a radius of 200 m around the warehouse. During the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, a fire of 
limited size in a chemical warehouse was reported shortly after the earthquake (Girgin, 2011). 
Dangerous substances stored in glass containers fell down because of the strong ground motion 
and the contents were spread onto the ground, causing the fire. In 11 March 2011, some 
warehouses in Japan – because of the earthquake and the tsunami – suffered major releases of 
hazardous materials, because packed products fell from racks and were ripped open (Krausmann 
& Cruz, 2013). 
During a natural event, safety in a chemical warehouse depends both on the structural 
performance of the building and on the dynamic performance of the storage racks and their 
contents (Castiglioni, 2008). In particular, earthquake ground motions can cause storage racks to 
collapse or overturn if they are not properly designed, installed, maintained, and loaded. In 
addition, individual packages or containers may spill or topple off, potentially causing releases of 
material. 
 
 
Figure 1. Intermediate Bulk Containers stored in warehouse racking (HSE, 2009). 
 
Information on the seismic response of chemical containers located in storage racks is very 
limited. Unfortunately, no clearly established data and statistics exist on potential damage of 
chemical racking systems during earthquakes. Frequently, after an earthquake event, loss of 
dangerous substances has been reported, with or without contemporary failure of the steel rack 
structural system (Castiglioni, 2008). Most probably, the structural failures were a consequence 
of the falling pallets and of the impact of the goods on the beams at the lower levels, creating a 
progressive dynamic collapse (Ng et al., 2009; Bajoria, 1986). Generally, failures of racks in 
earthquakes are most commonly reported in the cross-aisle direction (Castiglioni, 2008). 
This study aims to simulate the structural behaviour of various racking systems in the cross-
aisle direction for the worst-case scenario in order to quantify the vulnerability of chemical racks 
in seismic areas and to better understand the associated natech risk. A set of analytical fragility 
curves based on numerical simulation considering both structural parameters and the variation 
of motion intensity was developed. The damage state limits were considered as four levels of 
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intensity of loss of containment. A fault tree model was used to evaluate the overall loss 
probability of chemical racks with respect to the peak ground acceleration (PGA). A simple case 
study to assess the natech risk of chemical racks containing flammable substances based on the 
1786 Olivieri’s earthquake scenario was conducted using the JRC’s RAPID-N tool for rapid natech 
risk assessment and mapping (Girgin and Krausmann, 2013). 
The next section starts with a brief description of the typical seismic vulnerabilities of 
racking systems and a summary of the common layout and structural characteristics of chemical 
racks. Then, the proposed dynamic models used to describe the losses of dangerous substances, 
and the fault tree model are described. The numerical results, the case study, and the conclusions 
of the proposed methodology and presented fragility curves are treated in the last two sections 
of this report. 
2 Vulnerability of Racking Systems 
 
The rack industry calls the longitudinal direction of racking systems the down-aisle direction and 
the transverse direction, the cross-aisle direction. The cross-aisle frame dominates the dynamic 
behaviour in the cross-aisle direction of racking system when subjected to earthquake forces 
(Castiglioni, 2008). Despite their lightness, racking systems carry a very high live load (many 
times larger than the designed dead load) and can reach a considerable height. These systems – if 
installed in a seismic zone – are vulnerable to the dynamic forces generated by the earthquake 
motion. The most recent seismic design standards for steel storage racks set specific tests to 
evaluate the performance of the key components (R.M.I., 2002a; R.M.I., 2002b; FEM, 2001; RAL, 
1990; A.S., 1993; FEM, 2005). 
A convenient and widely adopted way to define the typical seismic vulnerability is the use of 
the seismic fragility concept. A seismic fragility curve is defined as the “conditional probability of 
an infrastructure type reaching or exceeding a specific level of damage” (Sasani et al., 2002). 
Empirical fragility curves are the most reliable, but due to the scarcity and ambiguities of damage 
observations, their derivation is not always possible. Therefore, in our case, analytical curves are 
the most appropriate, because it is possible to increase the observational data set by performing 
numerical analyses. These are evaluated from the statistical study of the numerical dynamic 
analysis results based often on simplified structural models (Calvi, 1999; Crowley et al., 2004). 
The loss of dangerous substances during an earthquake can endanger the life of the 
employees as well as of the population near the chemical warehouse. These losses can occur with 
the collapse of the entire rack as well as the falling of its containers due to the sliding and/or 
overturning of pallets or of containers. The sliding or overturning of chemical containers, due to 
the action of peak floor acceleration on the racks, and their consequent fall represents a limit 
state that might occur during a seismic event also in the case of a well-designed storage rack. 
These phenomena depend only on the dynamic friction coefficient between the pallet and the 
steel beam of the rack, and on the geometry of the containers. Therefore, in determining the 
likelihood of losses for racking systems, it is possible to identify four damage modes that could be 
sources for overall system losses. These modes are: 
 
1. overturning of the racking system due to the rocking motion and the failure of the 
anchorage, 
2. failure of the racking system due to the buckling of the bracing system, 
3. falling of chemical containers from the rack due to the sliding motion, and 
4. overturning of the containers with the subsequent fall from the rack. 
 
Their individual contributions can be combined with a fault tree analysis to evaluate the 
overall losses. The lognormal cumulative distribution was selected to model the seismic 
vulnerability of each of the above damage modes j, since it has been very frequently used for 
representing fragility relationships (FEMA, 1999; Pinto et al., 2004; Singhal & Kiremidjian, 1996). 
The probability for the jth damage mode Pj[DS|MIi,j] to exceed a certain damage state, given a 
specific value of Motion Intensity at the rack’s ith floor  (MIi,j), depends hence on the two 
parameters μj and σj of the lognormal distribution. These parameters have to be inferred by 
fitting the results of the analytical models with a lognormal curve. For each damage phenomenon, 
the model corresponding to the best fitting with empirical data is assumed as fragility curve: 
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 Pj DS MIi, j
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Φ
ln MIi, j( ) − μ j
σ j
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  (1) 
where MIi,j is the motion intensity at the ith rack floor for the jth damage mode; and Φ is the 
lognormal cumulative distribution function. 
There are a lot of studies in the literature that explain the structural properties of 
representative steel industrial storage racks (Blume, J. A. & Associates, 1973; Krawinkler et al., 
1979; Chen et al., 1980a; 1980b; 1981). In these studies, the fundamental periods of vibration – 
measured over a range of actual merchandise loading conditions – ranged from 0.2-1.0 s in the 
cross-aisle direction and from 0.7-3.0 s in the down-aisle direction. The first mode damping 
ratios ranged from 0.5-3.0% in the cross-aisle direction and 3-9% in the down-aisle direction. An 
experimental study of Filiatrault and Wanitkorkul (2004) observed that the racking systems are 
significantly more flexible and ductile, and have more dissipative capacity, in the down-aisle 
direction than in the cross-aisle direction. Since we are interested in worst-case situations, this 
study focuses on the cross-aisle direction. 
The standard chemical containers used in chemical warehouses (Figure 2) are individual 
packages stored on pallets for solid and powdery substances and 205-litre metal drums and 
Intermediate Bulk Containers (IBC; 450-3000 litre) for liquid substances. The quantity limits are 
regulated according to their class (i.e., the groupings, numbered from 1 to 9, into which 
dangerous goods are assigned on the basis of a common single or most significant hazard), 
packing group (i.e., one of three groups into which dangerous goods are divided for packaging 
purposes according to their degree of danger, and that are ranked in a decreasing order of 
danger: 1=high, 2=medium, and 3=low.), and physical state (ADR, 2012). 
 
   
Figure 2. Standard chemical containers used in chemical warehouses (HSE, 2009). 
 
Storage racks are normally configured as two rows of racks that are interconnected. Storage 
rack bays are typically 1.0-1.1 m deep and 1.8-2.7 m wide and can accommodate two or three 
pallets. The overall height of pallet rack structural frames found in retail warehouse stores varies 
between 5 and 6 m while in industrial warehouse facilities it ranges from 12 to 15 m or more 
(Castiglioni et al., 2008). Generally, the height for combustible storage is limited by general fire-
protection and life safety requirements (OFC, 2006; HSE, 2009). For example, the Oregon Fire 
Code (OFC, 2006) limits the storage height to 9.1 m for high-hazard commodities. Storages with 
greater heights are classified as extra-high-rack combustible storage and require special fire 
protection provisions. The main factors that influence the stability of the racking installation are 
the height-to-depth ratio and whether it is fixed to the floor or other suitable parts of the building 
structure (HSE, 2007). The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) requires that freestanding 
racks (i.e., not fixed to the floor) should not be used in areas where lift trucks, order pickers or 
other mechanical handling devices are used. Otherwise, it requires that when the height/depth 
ratio does not exceed 6:1 all uprights adjacent to aisles and gangways have to be fastened down 
with bolts (to reduce the risk of damage from accidental impact). If the height/depth ratio is 
higher than 6:1 but does not exceed 10:1, all uprights have to be fastened down. In any case, it is 
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important to note that in this regulation the bolts are designed to withstand the lateral impact of 
a mechanical device. 
Braced frames are typically used in the structural system in the cross-aisle direction. A recent 
study of Castiglioni et al. (2008) focuses on the seismic structural behaviour of steel selective 
pallet storage racks. In their study, typical structural elements in pallet storage racks were tested 
and characterized. Besides, friction coefficients (static μS and dynamic μd) between pallets and 
beams (i.e. wood or plastic vs. painted steel) were studied; the findings are used in the present 
study. The details of steel racking system dimensions, of mathematical structural models, and 
chosen seismic records are described in the following sections. 
3 Model Development for Cross-aisle Frames and Containers 
 
Typical natech consequence scenarios (explosion, fire, toxic dispersion) depend on the type and 
total amount of released dangerous substances and their storage conditions (Tugnoli et al., 
2007). Many difficulties arise in the prediction of a rack’s structural behaviour like buckling of 
the bracing or the failure of the anchoring, as it is affected by the particular geometry of their 
structural elements (Baldassino & Zandonini, 2001). Therefore, we split the dynamic failure of 
the cross-aisle frame and of chemical containers into three macro-models that consider the three 
different failure mechanisms, i.e., overturning, sliding, and buckling. 
In this report, for reasons of simplicity, only pure sliding and pure rocking were investigated, 
neglecting the slide-rock mode (Shenton, 1996). Sometimes, the pallet can get stuck and thus it 
cannot slide. Since the worst case was investigated, it was assumed that the peak floor 
acceleration for the rocking motion is not affected by the sliding of the pallet. In case of liquid 
chemical substances, the sloshing motion was neglected considering that the containers were 
treated as rigid blocks. In order to simplify the models, the length of the rack in the downward 
direction in the corridor was considered to be infinite. This assumption is reasonable and should 
not affect the results, because generally the length of the structure is much greater than its depth. 
In this study, the damage states (Xj<1=no fall; Xj≥1=fall) of chemical containers (i.e., local 
failures) and of the upright frame (i.e., global failure) were related to the vulnerability (i.e., 
damage state) of the racking system (Figure 3a) to losing its containment (i.e., when chemical 
containers are dropped from the frame). The damage states (DS) were defined with four levels of 
intensity of loss of rack containment (in other words, the percentage of containers that fall from 
the frame): DS0=no losses, DS1=moderate losses (≥30% of containers fall), DS2=extensive losses 
(≥60% containers fall), and DS3=complete loss of containment (100% containers fall). It is 
assumed that once the containers fall, the complete amount of substance contained therein will 
be released. As mentioned above, fault tree analysis was used to determine the likelihood of 
losses from racking systems due to the four damage modes introduced in Section 2 and discussed 
in more detail in the following sections. The fault tree model for earthquake-generated losses 
from chemical racks adopted in this study is presented in Figure 3b.  The probability P of being in 
or exceeding a given DS, i.e. the vulnerability of a racking system to lose its containment, is 
analytically given by: 
 
P DS PGA⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =
1 if DS = DS0
max max
j=1,2
Pj X j ≥ 1 MI0, j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ), PL,k
k=0
nFF DS( )−1∏⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
⎫⎬⎪⎭⎪
otherwise
⎧
⎨⎪⎪
⎩⎪⎪
 (2) 
where nFF is the number of simultaneous floor failures – i.e., when all containers of a given 
floor fall – required to cause an amount of loss that is defined by a given DS; Xj are parameters 
that describe the failure of the system for the jth damage mode (i.e., the system falls if Xj≥1); MI0,j 
is the motion intensity at the ground floor; P1[X1≥1|MI0,1] and P2[X2≥1|MI0,2] are the rack collapse 
probabilities due to overturning and buckling (defined by Eq. (1)); and PL,k is the vector sorted in 
descending order of the floor’s failure probabilities Pl,i. The latter Pl,i – i.e., the falling probability 
of containers from the ith floor – and the number of simultaneous floor failures nFF are given by: 
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nFF DS( ) = HΔhF +1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅YDS
⎡
⎢⎢
⎤
⎥⎥
            Pl ,i =
P4 X4 ≥ 1 MI0,4⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ i = 0
max
j=3,4
Pj X j ≥ 1 MIi, j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) i > 0
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
 (3) 
where H is the rack height; ΔhF is the inter-floor height; and YDS is a percentage that describes 
the loss intensity of rack containment (i.e., limit percentage of containers that fall from the frame: 
DS0=0%, DS1=30%, DS2=60%, and DS3=100%). The notation⎾x⏋indicates the smallest integer 
not less than x. P3[X3≥1|MIi,3] and P4[X4≥1|MIi,4] are the container falling probabilities due to 
sliding and overturning and MIi,j is the motion intensity at the ith floor. Hence, the failure 
probability distribution Pj[Xj≥1|MIi,j] at the ith floor and for the jth damage mode is computed 
using Eq. (1). The ground motion intensity (MIi,j) is measured with a dimensionless parameter, in 
order to increase the number of samples needed to fit the lognormal distributions and it is 
defined as follows: 
 MIi, j =
PFAi
acr , j  (4) 
where PFAi is the median Peak Floor Acceleration; and acr,j is defined as “critical horizontal 
acceleration” related to the jth failure mechanism. In this study, the PFAi is evaluated with a 
simplified procedure like that used in FEMA P-58 (FEMA, 2012). Analytically it is evaluated with 
a polynomial prediction equation given by: 
 
 ln
PFAi
PGA
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ = a0 + a1 ⋅hi + a2 ⋅
acr,1
g
+ a3 ⋅
acr,2
g
  with hi = ΔhF ⋅ i  (5) 
 
where hi is the height of the ith floor; acr,1 and acr,2 are the critical horizontal accelerations for 
rack overturning (j=1) and the buckling (j=2) of the bracing system; and ak are the regression 
coefficients. The critical horizontal accelerations will be discussed and explained in the following 
sections. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cross-aisle frame configuration (a) and Fault tree model (b) adopted in this study. 
 
The dataset of peak floor accelerations was evaluated summing the effects of the buckling 
and of the rocking models (Figure 4), under the presence of horizontal ground acceleration. The 
superposition of effects is valid if the cross-aisle frame does not slide, the rocking model has 
small rotation, and the cantilever has small elastic deformation. The details of the racking 
systems, the mathematical structural models, and the chosen seismic record are described in the 
following sections. 
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Figure 4. Cross-aisle frame mathematical models: buckling (a)+(b), and rocking (c). 
3.1 Rocking model 
 
This model studies the failure due to overturning of chemical containers and of the racking 
system in the cross-aisle direction considering the pure rocking mode (i.e., no slide) with impact 
and the effect of base anchorage. In a study of Makris and Zhang (1999), it was established that 
for earthquakes the effect of the vertical component of the ground motion is negligible with 
respect to the horizontal one in the rocking motion analysis. Moreover, it was demostrated that 
the restrainers are much more effective in preventing overturning for slender and smaller blocks. 
The racking system and containers were assumed as rigid blocks. The mathematical model 
considers that the rigid block – under the presence of horizontal ground acceleration – can 
oscillate about the centres of rotation O and O' when it is set to rocking (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Schematic of an anchored block in rocking motion (Makris & Zhang, 1999). 
Therefore, the equations that govern the rocking motion of the above-described model are 
the following (Makris & Zhang, 1999): 
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where ϑ is the rotation that describes the motion of the rigid block; I0 and m is the moment of 
inertia about pivot point O or O' and the mass of the block, respectively; R is the distance between 
the centre of gravity and the centre of rotation; g is the gravity acceleration; α is the angle 
defined in Figure 5; üg is the ground acceleration; Kel is the elastic stiffness of the anchorage; f(ϑ) 
is a function that models the nonlinear hysteretic behaviour of the anchorage; ሶߴ after impact and 
 are the rotational velocity after and before the impact; η is the restitution coefficient; 
and p is the frequency parameter of the block. Note that the oscillation frequency of a rigid block 
under free vibration is not constant since it strongly depends on the vibration amplitude 
(Housner, 1963). Nevertheless, the quantity p is a measure of the dynamic characteristics and the 
limit capacity of the block. 
Figure 6 illustrates the force-rotation relation of an anchorage with ductile behaviour. In 
general, the anchorage can exhibit a post-yielding stiffness and maintain its strength until it 
reaches the ultimate rotation. As mentioned above, the nonlinear hysteretic behaviour of the 
anchorage is analytically defined by the function f(ϑ) that was defined as follows: 
 
 
f ϑ( ) =
k* ⋅ ϑ 0 ≤ ϑ < ϑχ
ϑ + k* ⋅ϑχ ϑχ ≤ ϑ ≤ ϑχ + ϑY
k* ⋅ ϑ − ϑY( ) + ϑY ϑχ + ϑY < ϑ < ϑU ⋅ H ϑχ( )
0 ϑ ≥ ϑU ⋅ H ϑχ( )
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪
with 
χ = sign ϑ( )
k* =
K pl
Kel
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪  (7) 
 
where Kpl is the plastic stiffness of the anchorage; ϑY is the elastic rotation; ϑU is the ultimate 
rotation; H is the Heaviside function; and ϑχ is a variable (see Figure 6) that changes on each 
integration step and it is analytically defined as follows: 
 
  (8) 
where ϑχ− and ϑχ+ are the values of the variable before and after the integration step. 
 
Figure 6. Anchorage plastic behaviour. 
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In this study, in order to consider model and integration errors, the failure (i.e., overturning) 
of the rigid block occurs when the rotation reaches 90% of the angle α, or in other words, when 
the gravity load, i.e. the “stiffness” that returns the system to the initial state, becomes close to 
zero. Thus, the parameter that describes the overturning (X1 and X4), i.e. the failure of the rigid 
block, is defined as: 
 X j =
max ϑ t( )
α ⋅0.9
 with j = 1 or 4  (9) 
 
where ϑ(t) is the rotation of the rigid block at time t evaluated integrating Eq. (6). 
In order to compare the anchorage types, the static horizontal acceleration ast,j needed to 
break the anchorage was evaluated as follows: 
 
 ast, j =
2 ⋅sin α( ) ⋅ Fcr ϑcr( )
m ⋅cos α −ϑcr( ) + g ⋅ tan α −ϑcr( )    with   
j = 1 or 4
0 ≤ ϑcr ≤ ϑU
⎧⎨⎩  (10) 
 
where ϑcr is defined as the “critical rotation” that maximises the value of ast,j; and Fcr(ϑcr) is 
defined as the “equivalent anchorage strength”. The latter, in case of elastic-plastic behaviour, 
implicitly defines an equivalent model with brittle behaviour that has the same strain energy of 
the elastic-plastic model at ϑcr and it is given by: 
 
 
Fcr ϑcr( ) =
Kel ⋅ϑcr ϑcr ≤ ϑY
FY
ϑcr
⋅ ϑcr + 1+
Kpl
FY
⋅ ϑcr −ϑY( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⋅ ϑcr −ϑY( )⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
⎫⎬⎪⎭⎪
ϑcr > ϑY
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪  (11) 
 
In order to compare the results of anchored with unanchored blocks, an equivalent model 
was defined. This model consists of an equivalent unanchored rectangular block that has the 
same mass and dissipates the same amount of energy when the block reaches the critical rotation 
(ϑ  = ϑcr) and the verge of overturning (ϑ  = α) with respect to the anchored model with elastic-
brittle behaviour. The energy is evaluated assuming that at the verge of overturning and at the 
critical rotation, the kinetic energy of the block is zero, i.e. it is assumed that the earthquake 
excitation is terminated. The parameters that describe the equivalent model are given by: 
 
 
Req = R ⋅ 1+
Fcr ϑcr( ) ⋅ϑcr ⋅sinα
m ⋅ g ⋅ 1− cosϑcr( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
α eq = acos 1− 1− cosα( ) ⋅
1+
Fcr ϑcr( ) ⋅ϑcr ⋅sinα
m ⋅ g ⋅ 1− cosα( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
1+
Fcr ϑcr( ) ⋅ϑcr ⋅sinα
m ⋅ g ⋅ 1− cosϑcr( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪⎪
 (12) 
 
As indicated before, the frequency parameter p is a measure of the dynamic characteristics 
and the limit capacity of the block. For rectangular blocks, p2 = 3g/4R, i.e. the larger the block 
(larger R), the smaller is p and the smaller is the probability of failure Pj[Xj≥1|MIi,j]. Hence, to 
consider geometrical and scale effects, the minimum static acceleration needed to initiate the 
rocking of the equivalent unanchored rectangular block is divided by its frequency parameter p 
as follows: 
 
acr , j =
g ⋅ tanα eq
3⋅ g
4 ⋅ Req
 (13) 
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3.2 Sliding model 
 
This model studies the falling of chemical containers from the rack floors considering the pure 
sliding mode. The system is modelled as the SDOF sliding system described by Denoël and Degee 
(2005) and is defined as follows: 
  (14) 
 
where μS and μd are the static and dynamic friction coefficients; u is the mass displacement; 
acr,3, Δu and Δv are, respectively, the critical horizontal acceleration needed to initiate sliding, and 
the relative displacement and velocity between the mass and the support that are given by: 
  (15) 
The failure of the rigid block (i.e., when a container drops from its rack floor) occurs when 
the rigid block reaches the limit of relative displacement. Thus, the parameter that describes the 
failure for sliding (X3) is defined as: 
 X3 =
max Δu t( )
ΔuLim  (16) 
where ΔuLim is the relative displacement limit. 
 
3.3 Buckling model 
 
This model studies the failure of the first floor of racking system in the cross-aisle direction due 
to the buckling of the diagonal bracing at the ground floor. The system is modelled as a cantilever 
with lumped masses superposing the effects of bending and shear flexibility as shown in Figure 4. 
The equations that govern the dynamic motion are the following (Chopra, 1995): 
 
  (17) 
 
where mi are the floor masses; {u} is the vector of the floor horizontal displacements; [C] is 
the damping matrix; and [KS] and [KB] are the stiffness matrices of the racking system 
considering the shear and the bending flexibilities. The bending stiffness matrix is evaluated 
assuming the structural model shown in Figure 4b and the inertia I of the cantilever beam: 
 I =
AC
2
⋅b2 + 2 ⋅ IC
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  (18) 
where b is the inter-column distance in the cross-aisle direction (Figure 3a); and AC and IC are 
the area and the inertia of the upright columns. The shear stiffness matrix is evaluated assuming 
the structural model shown in Figure 4a and is analytically defined as follows: 
 
  (19) 
 
10 
 
where AB and EB are the area and the elastic modulus of the bracing trusses; ϕ is the angle 
defined in Figure 3a; and kS is the floor bracing stiffness. The maximum axial load NMAX due to the 
seismic ground motion, and the critical buckling load Ncr – assuming a buckling length factor 
equal to 0.5 – acting on the diagonal bracing truss of the first floor are given by: 
 
 
NMAX = EB ⋅ AB −
EB ⋅ AB ⋅cosϕ
cos atan tanϕ − F1,MAX ⋅ cos
−1ϕ ⋅sin−2 ϕ
EB ⋅ AB
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
    Ncr = EB ⋅ IB ⋅
π ⋅cosϕ
0.5 ⋅ ΔhB
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
 (20) 
 
 
where IB is the inertia of the diagonal truss; F1,MAX is the maximum absolute elastic force at the 
first floor evaluated with Eq. (17); and ΔhB is the “span” of the bracing system assuming a K-form. 
Besides, the critical acceleration needed to initiate the buckling at the first floor was defined as 
follows: 
 
acr ,2 =
EB ⋅ AB ⋅ ΔhB
mi ⋅ ΔhF ⋅ i
i
∑ ⋅sin2 ϕ ⋅ sinϕ − cosϕ ⋅ tanϕcr( )  with cosϕcr =
cosϕ
1− Ncr
EB ⋅ AB
 (21) 
 
In this study, in order to consider the non-linear behaviour of the bracing system, the racking 
system’s failure due to the buckling of the diagonal bracing at the ground floor is defined when 
the maximum axial load NMAX (reduced by 10% to consider model and integration errors) 
exceeds the critical buckling load Ncr. Thus, the parameter that describes the buckling failure (X2) 
is defined as: 
 
 X2 =
NMAX ⋅0.90
Ncr  
 (22) 
4 Numerical Results 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, the typical containers used in chemical warehouses are 
IBCs and metal drums. In this study, drums are assumed stacked to no more than four on a 
wooden pallet, which is located over a shelf (i.e., a surface that is the load level of the rack floor 
that, in this study, is composed of steel panels pinned on the beams of the rack, see Figure 3a). 
The IBCs have a plastic basement and are placed directly on the beams of the rack. The presence 
or absence of the shelf affects the limit states (i.e., the relative displacement limits ΔuLim) for the 
sliding of the containers (Table 1). 
μS μd ΔuLim
[-] [-] [m]
4 Drums on Wooden Pallet 0.5 0.14 0.4
IBC 0.2 0.1 0.2
Rigid Block Type 
 
Table 1. Friction properties (Castiglioni et al., 2008) and displacement limits used for the study 
for chemical containers. 
 
The characteristics of standard containers used in the present study are shown in Table 2. 
V Self weight H B W
[L] [kg] [mm] [mm] [mm]
Steel Drum 200 20.2 876 587 587
IBC (with plastic pallet) 1000 59 1160 1000 1200
"Philips" Wooden Pallet - 18.5 144 1000 1200
Container Type
 
Table 2. Dimensions and weights of standard containers (ANSI, 1997; D'Hollander, 1993; 
NWPCA, 1996). 
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In the present study, racking systems with constant bays (1 m deep and 2.2 m wide; i.e. two 
pallets per bay) and different heights (H= 3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, 9 m) with a constant inter-floor height ΔhF 
of 1.5 m were studied. More than 23,000 random combinations changing the density of chemical 
substance and the strength of the anchorage were considered. The set of combinations used had 
an average density of chemical substance of about 710 kg/m3 with a standard deviation (s.d.) of 
about 30%. To consider the spatial distribution of the containers and the worst-case scenario, it 
is assumed that during the earthquake the racking systems are 80% loaded with containers. For 
the braced frame we assumed a K-form and a “span” ΔhB of 0.65 m (see Figure 3a). The bracing 
system’s elements were assumed with cross-sections of 41 x 20.6 x 1.9mm (i.e., half solid 
channel), while the upright columns have a section 100/20b (Castiglioni, 2008). The latter can 
support loads of up to 95 kN, using a safety coefficient of 1.92. The base plate is connected to the 
foundation surface (when anchoring configuration is assumed) by means of two M16 (grade 8.8) 
bolts. The ultimate strength is evaluated using a safety coefficient of 1.2 (Eurocode 3). 
Geometrical properties and material characteristics of frame elements are reported in Table 3. 
 
Element Type A I E Fy Fu εu
[-] [mm2] [mm4] [GPa] [MPa] [MPa] [-]
Column 525.7 406100 210 348 493 25.5%
Bracing Truss 187.1 45000 210 348 493 25.5%
M16 (grade 8.8) bolts 157.0 - - - 667 -  
Table 3. Geometrical properties and material characteristics of rack elements (Castiglioni, 
2008). 
 
The reliability of the simplified structural model (i.e., buckling model) is confirmed by 
fundamental periods of vibration in the cross-aisle direction of the analysed racking systems that 
range from 0.17-0.72 s like those found in the literature (Castiglioni, 2008). 
 
3Rack Height [m] 97.54.5 6
Mean Period [s] 0.170 0.296 0.432 0.538 0.722
Standard deviation [-] 19% 18% 12% 19% 17%  
Table 4. Fundamental periods in the cross-aisle direction of the analysed racking systems. 
 
In accordance with the literature, a damping ratio of 2% and a restitution coefficient η equal 
to 0.9 were assumed for the dynamic analysis of the buckling and rocking models (Makris & 
Zhang, 1999). The properties of rigid blocks analysed with the rocking and sliding models are 
given in the Table 5. The chemical containers were assumed as unanchored, while the racking 
systems were studied under the assumption of three different anchorage types. When the 
racking system is free to rotate into the cross-aisle direction the anchorage type is “unanchored”, 
while it is “anchored” if the base is fastened to the floor with bolts. 
 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
[rad] [-] [kg] [-] [kg*m2] [-] [m] [-]
IBC 0.725 0% 804.67 33% 678 33% 0.754 0%
Drum 0.627 0% 168.59 32% 53 32% 0.503 0%
Rack (H=3) 0.283 27% 2594.09 35% 22551 35% 2.883 1%
Rack (H=4.5) 0.227 27% 3670.79 35% 52879 35% 3.619 1%
Rack (H=6) 0.189 28% 5100.54 27% 110244 27% 4.359 0%
Rack (H=7.5) 0.162 28% 5634.40 31% 170801 31% 5.102 0%
Rack (H=9) 0.142 28% 6755.18 28% 273867 28% 5.848 0%
Rigid Block Type 
α m I0 R
 
Table 5. Properties of the analysed rigid blocks. 
 
The anchorage’s behaviour is considered “brittle” when the strength of the bolts is lower 
than that of the upright column; vice versa it is considered “plastic”. The characteristics of the 
anchorage types analysed are given in Table 6 (these are derived from the geometrical properties 
and material characteristics of racking system in Table 3). 
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mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
[kN] [-] [kN] [-] [rad] [-] [rad] [-]
Anchored-Plastic 201 34% 279 34% 0.0027 0% 0.3825 0%
Anchored-Brittle 287 25% - - 0.0025 - - -
Unanchored - - - - - - - -
Anchorage Type
FY FU ϑY ϑU
 
Table 6. Properties of the analysed anchorage type blocks. 
4.1 Ground motion records 
 
Details of a set of ground motion records, which were used as the general set for the collapse 
fragility assessment of rack elements, are presented in Table 7. This general set, which includes 
26 records, was obtained from the PEER Strong Motion database 
(http://peer.berkeley.edu/smcat/search.html). The records are from a variety of different 
geological sites including rock and soft soil conditions. The peak ground acceleration ranges from 
0.45-1.78 g with a mean value of 0.89 g and a s.d. of 38%. 
 
M D
[-] [km]
P0806  Cape Mendocino 1992/04/25 CAPEMEND/CPM000 7.1 8.5
P1455  Chi-Chi, Taiwan 1999/09/20 CHICHI/TCU084-W 7.6 10.4
P1169  Chi-Chi, Taiwan 1999/09/20 CHICHI/CHY080-W 7.6 7.0
P1532  Chi-Chi, Taiwan 1999/09/20 CHICHI/WNT-E 7.6 1.2
P0409  Coalinga 1983/07/22 COALINGA/D-OLC270 5.8 8.2
P0414  Coalinga 1983/07/22 COALINGA/D-TSM360 5.8 9.2
P1547  Duzce, Turkey 1999/11/12 DUZCE/BOL090 7.1 17.6
P0127  Gazli, USSR 1976/05/17 GAZLI/GAZ090 6.8 3.0
P0178  Imperial Valley 1979/10/15 IMPVALL/H-E06230 6.5 1.0
P1056  Kobe 1995/01/16 KOBE/TAZ090 6.9 1.2
P0873  Landers 1992/06/28 LANDERS/LCN275 7.3 1.1
P0760  Loma Prieta 1989/10/18 LOMAP/BRN090 6.9 10.3
P0770  Loma Prieta 1989/10/18 LOMAP/LGP000 6.9 6.1
P0449  Morgan Hill 1984/04/24 MORGAN/CYC285 6.2 0.1
P0496  Nahanni, Canada 1985/12/23 NAHANNI/S1280 6.8 6.0
P0935  Northridge 1994/01/17 NORTHR/TAR090 6.7 17.5
P0996  Northridge 1994/01/17 NORTHR/PUL194 6.7 8.0
P0530  N. Palm Springs 1986/07/08 PALMSPR/NPS210 6.0 8.2
P0144  Tabas, Iran 1978/09/16 TABAS/TAB-TR 7.4 3.0
P0266  Victoria, Mexico 1980/06/09 VICT/CPE045 6.4 34.8
P0319  Westmorland 1981/04/26 WESTMORL/WSM180 5.8 13.3
P0701  Whittier Narrows 1987/10/01 WHITTIER/A-TAR090 6.0 43.0
P0082  San Fernando 1971/02/09 SFERN/PCD164 6.6 2.8
P0248  Mammoth Lakes 1980/05/27 MAMMOTH/L-LUL000 6.0 20.0
P0802  Erzincan, Turkey 1992/03/13 ERZIKAN/ERZ-NS 6.9 2.0
P0161  Imperial Valley 1979/10/15 IMPVALL/H-BCR230 6.5 2.5
Record/ComponentRecord ID Earthquake PGA PGV PGD
[g] [cm/s] [cm]
1.50 127 41.0
1.16 115 31.4
0.97 108 18.6
0.96 69 31.1
0.87 42 6.1
1.08 40 5.4
0.82 62 13.6
0.72 72 23.7
0.44 110 65.9
0.69 85 16.8
0.72 98 70.3
0.45 51 8.4
0.56 95 41.2
1.30 81 9.6
1.10 46 14.6
1.78 114 33.2
1.29 104 23.8
0.59 73 11.5
0.85 121 94.6
0.62 32 13.2
0.50 34 10.9
0.64 23 1.7
1.23 113 35.5
0.92 29 3.2
0.52 84 27.4
0.78 46 14.9  
Table 7. Details of a set of ground motion records (where M is the magnitude; D is the distance 
between the station and the earthquake source; PGV and PGD are the peak ground velocities and 
displacements). 
4.2 Fragility curves 
 
Utilizing the results of nonlinear dynamic analyses with the models presented above under the 
selected ground-motion forces, the polynomial regression coefficients of Eq. (5) and the 
lognormal fragility curve parameters (see Eq. (1)) were estimated by using the least squares 
method. Table 8 shows the regression coefficients for the analysed racks and the coefficient of 
determination R2. 
 
Height Range a0 a1 a2 a3 R2 N°
[m] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
3 - 9 -0.091 0.189 0.065 0.655 51% 32254  
Table 8. Regression coefficients of the PFA prediction equation(5). 
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The four fragility curves (blue lines) fitted to the analytical datasets (red triangles) are 
depicted in Figure 7 with the weight coefficients of the bins (green bars) adopted to fit 
cumulative lognormal models. 
Table 9 shows the lognormal distribution parameters for overturning, sliding, and buckling 
failures, the coefficient of determination R2, the number of simulations N°, and the application 
domain of the proposed formulas. The parameters were estimated with a generalized linear 
regression with a Probit link function to predict the probability of collapse as a function of ln(MI) 
(Agresti, 2012). Generalized linear regression uses maximum likelihood for estimation and the 
Probit link function is equivalent to using the normal cumulative distribution function as the 
fragility function. 
σ μ R2 N° MI Domain
[-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Overturning 0.75 15.51 96% 51454 0.5-70
Buckling 0.60 4.91 92% 7800 0.077-18
Sliding - ΔuLim = 0.2 m 1.01 3.02 96% 31252 0.729-45
Sliding - ΔuLim = 0.4 m 1.03 6.72 97% 31252 0.729-45
Failure Mode
 
Table 9. Fragility curve parameters for overturning, buckling, and sliding modes. 
 
It is worth noting that the simulations for chemical containers were performed with ground 
and floor accelerations, derived from the buckling model, while those of the racking system were 
carried out only with ground accelerations. Table 10 shows the number nFF of simultaneous floor 
failures defined for the selected rack heights. 
          YDS [-]  
H [m] 30% 60% 100%
3 1 2 3
4.5 2 3 4
6 2 3 5
7.5 2 4 6
9 3 5 7  
Table 10. Number nFF of simultaneous floor failures. 
 
Table 11, Table 12, Figure 8, and Figure 9 show the probabilities of being in or exceeding a 
given damage state (DS) – evaluated with Eq. (2) – for eighteen types of racking systems loaded 
with drums and IBCs. The chemical containers are assumed to be filled with a chemical substance 
that has a density of about 710 kg/m3 (e.g., gasoline). The eighteen types of racking systems 
differ in height (H = 3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, and 9 m) and anchorage type (unanchored, anchored-brittle, 
and anchored-plastic). The structural characteristics of the racking system (i.e., sections, inertias, 
bolts, etc.) have been assumed according to mechanical features described in Table 1, Table 2 and 
Table 3. 
The obtained analytical fragility curves exhibit a higher level of total falling probability (i.e., 
DS3) with increasing rack height and the decreasing of the robustness of the anchorage. At the 
same time, the falling probability of containers (i.e., DS1 and DS2) decreases with respect to the 
decreasing of the robustness of the anchorage. This effect is due to the reduction of the PFA 
intensity. Racks loaded with IBCs showed a higher level of falling probability of containers 
compared with those loaded with drums, due to the lower friction coefficient and the higher 
weight. 
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Figure 7.  Failure probabilities for overturning, buckling, and sliding modes (Du,lim indicates the 
relative displacement limit). 
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Anchored-Brittle & H=3m-DS1 0% 0% 2% 5% 9% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 32% 36% 41% 45% 49% 52%
Anchored-Brittle & H=3m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 6% 9% 12% 15% 19% 22% 26% 29% 33% 36%
Anchored-Brittle & H=3m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 6% 9% 12% 15% 19% 22% 26% 29% 33% 36%
Anchored-Brittle & H=4.5m-DS1 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 32% 36% 40% 43%
Anchored-Brittle & H=4.5m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 32% 36% 40% 43%
Anchored-Brittle & H=4.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 32% 36% 40% 43%
Anchored-Brittle & H=6m-DS1 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 19% 24% 28% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49%
Anchored-Brittle & H=6m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 19% 24% 28% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49%
Anchored-Brittle & H=6m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 19% 24% 28% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49%
Anchored-Brittle & H=7.5m-DS1 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 8% 13% 18% 23% 30% 36% 42% 47% 52% 57% 61%
Anchored-Brittle & H=7.5m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 8% 13% 18% 23% 28% 32% 37% 42% 46% 50% 53%
Anchored-Brittle & H=7.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 8% 13% 18% 23% 28% 32% 37% 42% 46% 50% 53%
Anchored-Brittle & H=9m-DS1 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 10% 15% 20% 26% 31% 36% 41% 45% 50% 54% 57%
Anchored-Brittle & H=9m-DS2 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 10% 15% 20% 26% 31% 36% 41% 45% 50% 54% 57%
Anchored-Brittle & H=9m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 10% 15% 20% 26% 31% 36% 41% 45% 50% 54% 57%
Anchored-Plastic & H=3m-DS1 0% 2% 8% 15% 23% 30% 38% 46% 53% 59% 65% 69% 73% 77% 79% 82%
Anchored-Plastic & H=3m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 6% 10% 15% 20% 26% 32% 38% 44% 49% 53% 58%
Anchored-Plastic & H=3m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 4% 5% 7% 9% 11%
Anchored-Plastic & H=4.5m-DS1 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 8% 12% 18% 24% 30% 37% 43% 48% 53% 58% 62%
Anchored-Plastic & H=4.5m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 7% 10% 14% 19% 23% 28% 33% 37%
Anchored-Plastic & H=4.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 7%
Anchored-Plastic & H=6m-DS1 0% 0% 1% 3% 7% 12% 18% 26% 34% 41% 48% 54% 59% 64% 68% 72%
Anchored-Plastic & H=6m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 8% 12% 17% 23% 28% 34% 39% 45% 49%
Anchored-Plastic & H=6m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 4% 6%
Anchored-Plastic & H=7.5m-DS1 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 10% 16% 23% 30% 37% 44% 50% 55% 60% 65% 69%
Anchored-Plastic & H=7.5m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 4% 6% 9% 12% 15% 19% 23%
Anchored-Plastic & H=7.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 4% 5% 7% 9% 12% 14% 17%
Anchored-Plastic & H=9m-DS1 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 8% 14% 20% 26% 33% 40% 46% 51% 56% 61%
Anchored-Plastic & H=9m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 7% 10% 14% 18% 22% 26% 30% 34%
Anchored-Plastic & H=9m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 7% 10% 14% 18% 22% 26% 30% 34%
Unanchored & H=3m-DS1 0% 0% 2% 5% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 31% 36% 40% 44% 48% 52%
Unanchored & H=3m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 12% 15% 19% 24% 28% 32% 35% 39% 43%
Unanchored & H=3m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 12% 15% 19% 24% 28% 32% 35% 39% 43%
Unanchored & H=4.5m-DS1 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 20% 24% 29% 33% 38% 42% 45% 49%
Unanchored & H=4.5m-DS2 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 20% 24% 29% 33% 38% 42% 45% 49%
Unanchored & H=4.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 20% 24% 29% 33% 38% 42% 45% 49%
Unanchored & H=6m-DS1 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 9% 13% 18% 23% 28% 33% 38% 42% 47% 51% 54%
Unanchored & H=6m-DS2 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 9% 13% 18% 23% 28% 33% 38% 42% 47% 51% 54%
Unanchored & H=6m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 9% 13% 18% 23% 28% 33% 38% 42% 47% 51% 54%
Unanchored & H=7.5m-DS1 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 11% 16% 21% 27% 32% 37% 42% 47% 52% 57% 61%
Unanchored & H=7.5m-DS2 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 11% 16% 21% 27% 32% 37% 42% 47% 51% 55% 59%
Unanchored & H=7.5m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 11% 16% 21% 27% 32% 37% 42% 47% 51% 55% 59%
Unanchored & H=9m-DS1 0% 0% 1% 3% 7% 12% 18% 24% 30% 36% 41% 46% 50% 55% 59% 62%
Unanchored & H=9m-DS2 0% 0% 1% 3% 7% 12% 18% 24% 30% 36% 41% 46% 50% 55% 59% 62%
Unanchored & H=9m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 3% 7% 12% 18% 24% 30% 36% 41% 46% 50% 55% 59% 62%
1 1.1 1.2 1.50.6                                            P GA [g]  
Rack Type                  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.40.7 0.8 0.9
 
Table 11. Numerical values of probabilities of being in or exceeding a given DS for racking 
systems loaded with drums. 
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Anchored-Brittle & H=3m-DS1 0% 14% 34% 50% 61% 69% 75% 80% 83% 86% 88% 90% 91% 92% 93% 94%
Anchored-Brittle & H=3m-DS2 0% 1% 8% 19% 30% 40% 49% 56% 62% 68% 72% 75% 78% 81% 83% 85%
Anchored-Brittle & H=3m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 6% 9% 12% 16% 20% 23% 27% 31% 34% 37%
Anchored-Brittle & H=4.5m-DS1 0% 2% 13% 27% 40% 50% 59% 66% 71% 76% 79% 82% 85% 87% 89% 90%
Anchored-Brittle & H=4.5m-DS2 0% 0% 3% 10% 19% 28% 37% 45% 52% 58% 63% 68% 71% 75% 78% 80%
Anchored-Brittle & H=4.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 9% 12% 16% 21% 25% 29% 33% 37% 41% 44%
Anchored-Brittle & H=6m-DS1 0% 5% 21% 38% 52% 62% 70% 76% 80% 84% 87% 89% 90% 92% 93% 94%
Anchored-Brittle & H=6m-DS2 0% 1% 6% 17% 29% 40% 50% 58% 64% 70% 74% 78% 81% 83% 86% 87%
Anchored-Brittle & H=6m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 20% 25% 29% 34% 38% 42% 46% 50%
Anchored-Brittle & H=7.5m-DS1 0% 9% 32% 51% 64% 73% 79% 84% 87% 90% 92% 93% 95% 95% 96% 97%
Anchored-Brittle & H=7.5m-DS2 0% 0% 4% 13% 24% 35% 45% 53% 61% 66% 71% 75% 79% 82% 84% 86%
Anchored-Brittle & H=7.5m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 9% 13% 18% 23% 28% 33% 38% 42% 47% 50% 54%
Anchored-Brittle & H=9m-DS1 0% 4% 22% 42% 57% 67% 75% 81% 85% 88% 90% 92% 93% 95% 95% 96%
Anchored-Brittle & H=9m-DS2 0% 0% 3% 10% 21% 32% 42% 51% 58% 65% 70% 74% 78% 81% 83% 85%
Anchored-Brittle & H=9m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 10% 15% 21% 26% 32% 37% 42% 46% 50% 54% 58%
Anchored-Plastic & H=3m-DS1 0% 31% 57% 72% 81% 86% 90% 92% 94% 95% 96% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98%
Anchored-Plastic & H=3m-DS2 0% 7% 26% 45% 58% 68% 75% 80% 84% 87% 90% 91% 93% 94% 95% 96%
Anchored-Plastic & H=3m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
Anchored-Plastic & H=4.5m-DS1 0% 8% 30% 49% 63% 72% 79% 83% 87% 89% 91% 93% 94% 95% 96% 96%
Anchored-Plastic & H=4.5m-DS2 0% 1% 12% 27% 41% 53% 62% 69% 75% 79% 83% 85% 88% 89% 91% 92%
Anchored-Plastic & H=4.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
Anchored-Plastic & H=6m-DS1 0% 13% 38% 58% 70% 78% 84% 88% 91% 93% 94% 95% 96% 97% 97% 98%
Anchored-Plastic & H=6m-DS2 0% 3% 18% 36% 50% 62% 70% 77% 81% 85% 88% 90% 91% 93% 94% 95%
Anchored-Plastic & H=6m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 7% 9%
Anchored-Plastic & H=7.5m-DS1 0% 11% 36% 55% 68% 77% 83% 87% 90% 92% 93% 95% 96% 96% 97% 97%
Anchored-Plastic & H=7.5m-DS2 0% 0% 5% 16% 28% 40% 50% 59% 65% 71% 75% 79% 82% 85% 87% 88%
Anchored-Plastic & H=7.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 4% 6% 8% 11% 14% 17% 21% 24%
Anchored-Plastic & H=9m-DS1 0% 5% 25% 45% 60% 71% 78% 83% 87% 90% 92% 93% 94% 95% 96% 97%
Anchored-Plastic & H=9m-DS2 0% 0% 3% 12% 24% 36% 46% 55% 62% 68% 73% 77% 80% 83% 85% 87%
Anchored-Plastic & H=9m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 20% 25% 29% 34% 39% 43%
Unanchored & H=3m-DS1 0% 14% 34% 49% 61% 69% 75% 79% 83% 86% 88% 90% 91% 92% 93% 94%
Unanchored & H=3m-DS2 0% 1% 8% 19% 30% 40% 49% 56% 62% 67% 72% 75% 78% 81% 83% 85%
Unanchored & H=3m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 28% 32% 36% 40% 43%
Unanchored & H=4.5m-DS1 0% 2% 13% 27% 39% 50% 59% 66% 71% 76% 79% 82% 85% 87% 88% 90%
Unanchored & H=4.5m-DS2 0% 0% 3% 10% 18% 28% 37% 45% 52% 58% 63% 67% 71% 74% 77% 80%
Unanchored & H=4.5m-DS3 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 7% 11% 15% 20% 25% 29% 34% 38% 42% 46% 50%
Unanchored & H=6m-DS1 0% 5% 21% 38% 51% 62% 70% 76% 80% 84% 86% 89% 90% 92% 93% 94%
Unanchored & H=6m-DS2 0% 1% 6% 17% 29% 40% 50% 58% 64% 70% 74% 78% 81% 83% 85% 87%
Unanchored & H=6m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 9% 14% 18% 24% 29% 34% 38% 43% 47% 51% 55%
Unanchored & H=7.5m-DS1 0% 9% 31% 50% 64% 73% 79% 84% 87% 90% 92% 93% 94% 95% 96% 97%
Unanchored & H=7.5m-DS2 0% 0% 4% 12% 24% 35% 45% 53% 60% 66% 71% 75% 79% 81% 84% 86%
Unanchored & H=7.5m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 3% 6% 11% 16% 21% 27% 32% 38% 42% 47% 51% 55% 59%
Unanchored & H=9m-DS1 0% 4% 22% 41% 56% 67% 75% 81% 85% 88% 90% 92% 93% 94% 95% 96%
Unanchored & H=9m-DS2 0% 0% 3% 10% 21% 32% 42% 51% 58% 64% 69% 74% 77% 80% 83% 85%
Unanchored & H=9m-DS3 0% 0% 1% 3% 7% 13% 18% 24% 30% 36% 41% 46% 51% 55% 59% 62%
0.4 0.5 1.3 1.40.7 0.8 0.9                                            P GA [g]  
Rack Type                  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 1 1.1 1.2 1.50.6
 
Table 12. Numerical values of probabilities of being in or exceeding a given DS for racking 
systems loaded with IBCs. 
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Figure 8. Probabilities of being in or exceeding a given DS for racking systems loaded with 
drums. 
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Figure 9. Probabilities of being in or exceeding a given DS for racking systems loaded with IBCs. 
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5 Case Study 
 
This section provides a numerical example to assess the natech risk using the above fragility 
curves on chemical racks situated inside a warehouse. The RAPID-N (rapid natech risk 
assessment and mapping framework) was used to perform a simplified case study to assess the 
natech risk due to the 1786 Oliveri earthquake scenario. The framework assesses the risk of 
hazardous-material release, fire or explosion due to natural hazard impact (Girgin & Krausmann, 
2013). This case study does not aim to assess the true risk level of the warehouse, but it aims to 
provide a demonstration of the potential impact of an earthquake on chemical racks. The 1786 
Oliveri earthquake scenario was selected because it is well documented and a shake map 
calculated by the Instituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV) is available. 
The Oliveri territory is located in one of the areas with the highest seismic potential of Sicily 
(Meletti and Valensise, 2004). The seismic activity recorded in the last 20 years is characterized 
by about 3500 events with local magnitude greater than 2 and hypocentres (89% of 3500) 
concentrated around an average depth of about 10 km (Giunta et al., 2004). Because of its high 
seismic hazard the urban area of Oliveri has been the subject of first level seismic micro-
zonation. The first earthquake with a destructive effect in the Oliveri area, reported in the 
catalogue of historical Italian seismicity, occurred on 10 March 1786. This seismic event was 
characterized by MW = 6.1, an epicentre with a depth of 10 km at Oliveri and an MCS intensity 
equal to IX in the urban area. This earthquake severely damaged all the cities of the Gulf of Patti 
in northern Sicily and almost destroyed the town of Oliveri (Guidoboni et al., 2007). 
Since the industrial area of Milazzo is the closest industrial area to the epicentre of the 1786 
Olivieri earthquake, eight types of chemical racks were assumed to be located inside a 
hypothetical chemical warehouse within the industrial area. Figure 10 shows the PGA 
distribution, provided by INGV for the 1786 earthquake that ranges from 0.01 to 0.4 g. 
 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of on-site PGA for the 1786 Olivieri earthquake scenario (INGV, 2014). 
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In order to assess the natech risk of chemical racks containing a flammable substance, it is 
assumed that the chemical containers are filled with gasoline. The TNO Single Point model was 
used to calculate the end-point distances. The end-point radiation intensity was assumed to be 
5003 W/m2, which corresponds to 2nd degree burns (EPA, 1999). For liquid spills, the minimum 
pool depth that can be formed by the substance was assumed to be 1 cm as in the EPA 
methodology. Table 13 summarizes the characteristics of the chemical racks hypothesized for the 
case study. 
Lenght Height
[m] [m]
R01 9 3 Unanchored IBC 24 Gasoline
R02 9 4.5 Unanchored IBC 32 Gasoline
R03 9 4.5 Anchored-Brittle IBC 32 Gasoline
R04 9 9 Anchored-Plastic IBC 56 Gasoline
R05 9 3 Unanchored Drum 24 Gasoline
R06 9 4.5 Unanchored Drum 32 Gasoline
R07 9 4.5 Anchored-Brittle Drum 32 Gasoline
R08 9 9 Anchored-Plastic Drum 56 Gasoline
Unit  Anchorage Type Containers'
Type
N°
Containers
Substance Qstored
[kg]
80% 14208
80% 18944
80% 18944
80% 33152
80% 11366
80% 15155
80% 15155
80% 26522
Filling 
Level
 
Table 13. Characteristics of the chemical racks. 
 
Based on the input information of chemical racks discussed above and the ShakeMap 
provided by INGV for the 1786 Olivieri earthquake scenario, the results of the case study– as 
provided as RAPID-N outputs – are shown in Table 14. RAPID-N automatically determined that 
the industrial site is about 25 km away from the epicentre and that it was subjected to an on-site 
PGA of about 0.11 g. Depending on rack type and the on-site hazard parameters, RAPID-N selects 
the appropriate fragility curve and estimates the damage states and the consequence scenarios. 
In this case study, the released substance quantity (i.e., the so called QReleased) is assumed to be the 
same as the percentage of containers that fall from the racking system. 
 
[m/s2]
R01 1.068
R02 1.068
R03 1.068
R04 1.068
R05 1.068
R06 1.068
R07 1.068
R08 1.068
PDS = Probability
Unit  PGA PDS QReleased PDS QReleased dEP PN PDS QReleased dEP PN PDS QReleased dEP PN
[-] [kg] [-] [kg] [m] [-] [-] [kg] [m] [-] [-] [kg] [m] [-]
84.5% 0 13.98% 4689 119 2.80% 1.50% 9519 170 0.30% 0.01% 14208 207 0.003%
97.1% 0 2.66% 9472 169 0.53% 0.23% 14208 207 0.05% 0.02% 18944 239 0.005%
97.0% 0 2.71% 9472 169 0.54% 0.24% 14208 207 0.05% 0.01% 18944 239 0.003%
93.6% 0 6.17% 16576 224 1.23% 0.19% 24864 274 0.04% 0.00%  -  -  - 
99.6% 0 0.39% 5683 131 0.08% 0.00%  -  -  - 0.01% 11366 185 0.002%
100.0% 0 0.00%  -  -  - 0.00%  -  -  - 0.02% 15155 214 0.005%
100.0% 0 0.00%  -  -  - 0.00%  -  -  - 0.01% 15155 214 0.003%
100.0% 0 0.00%  -  -  - 0.00%  -  -  - 0.00%  -  -  - 
 to be in a certain DS; PN = Natech Probability related to a DS; dEP = Pool fire's end-point distance
DS0 DS1 DS2 DS3
 
Table 14. Summary of the natech risk assessment results for chemical racks. 
 
According to the results of this RAPID-N test case, the minimum end-point distance for 
receiving 2nd degree burns is found to be 119 m with an occurrence probability of 2.8%, whereas 
the maximum is 239 m with a probability of 0.005%. Potential domino effects should also be 
considered for a more accurate assessment of the natech risk. The current version of RAPID-N 
does not yet support these features. 
Moreover, the results indicate that possibly major natech accidents are to be expected in 
chemical racks loaded with IBCs, because they have a lower friction coefficient and a higher 
weight. Although the racks R02 and R03 have the same load and height, the falling probabilities 
DS1 and DS2 of R03 are higher than those of R02, because the robustness of the anchorage 
increases the PFA intensity. 
6 Conclusions 
 
This work presented an approach for developing fragility curves for chemical racking systems in 
the cross-aisle direction through dynamic non-linear analyses. The damage state limits of the 
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overall racking system were defined as four levels of intensity of loss of rack containment, i.e. the 
percentage of containers that fall from the steel storage rack. These are: DS0 = no losses, DS1 = 
moderate losses (≥30% of falls), DS2 = extensive losses (≥60% of falls), and DS3 = complete 
losses of containment (100% of falls). In order to evaluate the structural vulnerability of the 
chemical containers and of the overall racking system, three damage modes (i.e., overturning, 
sliding, and buckling) were identified. Analytical fragility curves – as a function of the PFA – were 
constructed for each damage mode. A fault tree model was used to evaluate the falling 
probabilities of chemical containers from racks as a function of the PGA combining the fragility 
curves of the three damage modes. In order to assess the seismic vulnerability of a suite of 
chemical racking systems that respect the height limits for fire protection, to evaluate the effect 
of the anchorage on the seismic performance, and to study the influence of the friction coefficient 
between chemical containers and the rack’s beams, two types of chemical containers (205 l metal 
drums and 1000 l IBCs), three types of rack base anchoring (unanchored, anchored-brittle, and 
anchored-plastic), and four rack heights (3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, 9 m) were studied. Overall twenty-four 
fragility curves were developed. As an input motion to the three damage models, twenty-six 
strong motion records were selected from the PEER Strong Motion database. 
In order to assess the natech risk of a chemical rack containing a flammable substance, to test 
the developed fragility curves, and to illustrate the natech risk assessment and mapping 
capabilities of RAPID-N, a case study based on the 1786 Olivieri earthquake scenario was 
conducted. The findings demonstrate that chemical racks loaded with IBCs are more vulnerable 
than those loaded with drums, because they have a lower friction coefficient and a higher weight. 
Moreover, although a robust anchorage reduces the probability of collapse of the rack, it 
increases the PFA intensity and therefore the probabilities of falling DS1 and DS2. 
Further studies using different layouts and types of merchandise chemical containers and of 
storage racks representing current construction practices and innovative systems are necessary 
to refine the fragility curve development for chemical racking structures. Moreover, the rack 
behaviour in the down-aisle direction and the structural interaction between neighbouring racks 
were not considered for constructing the analytical fragility curves in this study. Inclusion of 
these aspects in future studies is necessary. However, the analytical method employed in this 
study can be used for deriving fragility curves for others merchandise types of racking structures. 
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8 List of symbols 
 
PGA Peak ground acceleration; 
MIi,j Motion intensity at the ith rack’s floor for the jth damage mode; 
μj Mean of the lognormal distribution for the jth damage mode; 
σj Standard deviation of the lognormal distribution for the jth damage mode; 
DS Damage state; 
Pj[DS|MIi,j] Probability for a jth damage mode that a certain damage state is exceeded, given a 
specific value of motion intensity at the ith rack’s floor; 
Φ Lognormal cumulative distribution function; 
P[DS|PGA] Probability of being in or exceeding a given DS, i.e. the vulnerability of racking 
system to lose its containment; 
nFF Number of simultaneous “floor’s failures” – i.e., when all containers of a given 
floor fall – needed to have the loss intensity defined by a given DS; 
Xj Parameters that describe the failure of the system for each jth damage mode (i.e., 
the system fall if Xj≥1); 
Pl,i Falling probability of containers from the ith floor; 
PL,k Vector sorted in descending order of the floor’s failures probabilities Pl,I; 
H Height; 
ΔhF Inter-floor height; 
YDS Percentage that describes the loss intensity of rack containment (i.e., limit 
percentage of containers that fall from the frame: DS0=0%, DS1=30%, DS2=60%, 
and DS3=100%); 
PFAi Median peak floor acceleration 
acr,j “Critical horizontal accelerations” related to the jth failure mechanism; 
hi Height of the ith floor; 
ak Regression coefficients of the polynomial prediction equation to determinate the 
PFAi is the median Peak Floor Acceleration 
ϑ Rotation that describe the motion of the rigid block; 
I0 Moment of inertia about pivot point O or O'; 
m Mass of the block; 
R Distance between the centre of gravity and the centre of rotation; 
g Gravity acceleration; 
α Angle defined in Figure 5; 
üg Ground acceleration; 
Kel Elastic stiffness of the anchorage; 
f(ϑ) A function that models the nonlinear hysteretic behaviour of the anchorage; 
 Rotational velocity after the impact; 
 Rotational velocity before the impact; 
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η Restitution coefficient; 
p Frequency parameter of the rigid block; 
Kpl Plastic stiffness of the anchorage; 
FY Yielding load of the anchoring; 
FU Ultimate load of the anchoring; 
ϑY Elastic range rotation; 
ϑU Ultimate rotation; 
H() Heaviside function; 
ϑχ A variable that changes on each integration step (see Figure 6);  
ϑχ− Value of the variable before the integration step;  
ϑχ+ Value of the variable after the integration step; 
ast,j Static horizontal acceleration needed to break the anchorage; 
ϑc “Critical rotation” that maximise the value of ast,j; 
Fcr(ϑc) “Equivalent anchorage strength”; 
αeq Equivalent angle α; 
Req Equivalent distance between the centre of gravity and the centre of rotation; 
μS Static friction coefficient; 
μd Dynamic friction coefficient; 
u Mass displacement; 
Δu Relative displacement between the mass and the support; 
Δv Relative velocity between the mass and the support; 
ΔuLim Relative displacement limit 
mi Floor’s masses; 
{u} Vector of floor horizontal displacements; 
[C] Damping matrix; 
[KS] Stiffness matrix of the racking system considering the shear flexibility; 
[KS] Stiffness matrix of the racking system considering the bending flexibility; 
I Inertia of the cantilever beam; 
b Inter-column distance in the cross-aisle direction; 
AC Area of the upright columns; 
IC Inertia of the upright columns; 
AB Area of the bracing trusses; 
EB Elastic modulus of the bracing trusses; 
ϕ Angle defined in Figure 3a; 
kS Floor bracing stiffness; 
NMAX Maximum axial load due to the seismic ground motion acting on the diagonal 
bracing truss of the first floor; 
Ncr Critical buckling load – assuming a buckling length factor equal to 0.5 – acting on 
the diagonal bracing truss of the first floor; 
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IB Inertia of the diagonal truss; 
F1,MAX Maximum absolute elastic force at the first floor; 
ΔhB “Span” of the bracing system assuming a K-form; 
QStored Substance stored; 
QReleased Substance released; 
PDS Probability to be in a certain DS; 
PN Natech Probability related to a DS; 
dEP Pool fire's end-point distance. 
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